The traditional Becker/Arrow style model of discrimination depicts majority and minority and workers as perfectly substitutable inputs, implying that all workers have the same job assignment. The model is only appropriate for determining whether pay differences between, for example, whites and non-whites doing job assignment A are attributable to prejudice ('within-assignment discrimination'); It is inappropriate, however, for determining whether pay differences between whites in job assignment A and non-whites in job assignment B reflect discriminatory behaviour ('cross-assignment discrimination'). We test the model of such cross assignment discrimination developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) using data on Major League Baseball hitters and pitchers for four different seasons during the 1990s, a decade during which monopsony power fell. We find strong evidence of ceteris paribus racial pay differences between hitters and pitchers, as well as evidence that cross-assignment discrimination varies with labour market structure.
Introduction
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, the median weekly earnings of male and female elementary and middle school teachers in 2006 were $920 and $824, respectively, whereas for male and female school principals and school district superintendents, median weekly earnings were $1275 and $1107, respectively. During the same year, the median weekly earnings of male and female registered nurses were $1074 and $971, respectively, whereas for male and female physicians and surgeons they were $1847 and $1329, respectively. Median weekly earnings of male and female cooks were $377 and $340, respectively, whereas for male and female restaurant waiters they were $284 and $348, respectively. Second, in each example for which data on earnings of each gender are available, there are noticeable gender pay gaps within job assignments -9 per cent for school teachers, 20 per cent for principals and superintendents, nearly 10 per cent for registered nurses, 28 per cent for physicians and surgeons, nearly 30 per cent for lawyers, 10 per cent for cooks and 22.5
per cent for waitpersons (in favour of females, however). A commonly asked question would be: How much of these intra-job gender pay gaps are attributable to discrimination? This is the approach taken in the traditional wage discrimination model, due originally to Becker (1971) and Arrow (1973) . This model is based on the fundamental assumption that majority and minority workers are perfect substitutes in production. Consequently, the traditional 3 model is only appropriate for studying gender, racial, age, sexual orientation or other group pay differences for workers performing the same job assignment.
In this paper, we address a different and more nuanced question: To what extent is majority/minority pay across complementary job assignments within a firm attributable to discrimination? For example, how much of the $931 (65.6%) pay gap between male aircraft pilots and flight engineers and female transportation attendants, the $1165 pay gap between male lawyers and female legal assistants and the $876 pay gap between male physicians and surgeons and female registered nurses, attributable to discrimination? Are these gaps primarily attributable to majority/minority productivity differences or to prejudice? This is a question about inter-job wage discrimination and it is a far more difficult question because to
answer it we need to compare majority and minority workers for which there will be both distinct productivity and labour supply differences. In the traditional (intra-job assignment) model of wage discrimination, details of the production function are dispensed with because there are no productivity and labour supply differences between workers. In a study of discrimination across job assignments, however, the production and labour supply functions must be given explicit consideration.
In what follows we empirically test the model of pay discrimination across job assignments developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) -hereafter BS -on an industry characterized by complementary job assignments, racial integration, variation in monopsony power across worker groups and a history of racial discrimination -U.S. Major League Baseball.
We employ a novel, two-stage regression methodology in which a standardised measure (i.e. common) measure of productivity is estimated separately for each occupation.
We then incorporate this measure as a right-hand-side explanatory variable in a second-stage, all-occupation regression designed to estimate cross-assignment discrimination. Our empirical analysis finds convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player job assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and positionspecific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BS' theoretical prior that racial pay differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities.
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the previous literature on the economics of discrimination whilst Section 4 outlines our test case of Major League
Baseball. Our empirical analysis is presented in Section 5 whilst final comments are collected in Section 6.
Previous Literature
While most of the literature on discrimination has focused on the measurement of the majority/minority pay gap within the same job category, some researchers have suggested that the required assumption of perfect substitution between inputs may be somewhat inappropriate. Indeed, Becker alluded to this issue by sketching a brief extension to his twofactor black/white worker model to a three-factor model [see Becker (1971, pp. 59-62) ]. Two of the factors are perfectly substitutable blacks and whites that belong to a group that could be termed 'Type 1 Labour.' Then, there is a third labour input, 'Type 2 Labour,' that both discriminates against blacks and is complementary to, or imperfectly substitutable, for them.
Type 2 workers could, for example, be managers. In this situation, Becker showed that there would be a ceteris paribus black/white wage gap within the Type 1 category. Arrow (1973) elaborated on this by showing that the black/white wage gap depends upon the sensitivity of Type 2 labour's reservation wage to the fraction of the firm's labour force that is black, as well as the importance of Type 2 labour as an input (importance is measured as the size of the payments to Type 2 labour relative to Type 1 labour). Neither Becker nor Arrow tested these propositions, nor did they investigate further the implications of complementarity in production for the black/white pay differential. Welch (1967) raised the possibility that blacks and whites working in the same firm may not be perfect substitutes because there may be differences in their educational endowments. Welch suggested that, perhaps because of long-term discrimination, blacks may have acquired less schooling and/or attended lower quality schools. He modelled educational endowments and physical labour as separate factors of production, allowing for racial differences in educational endowments and, following Becker and Arrow, white co-worker discrimination. He argued that if firms choose racially integrated labour forces then blacks and whites must be complementary inputs. The intuition is that because of whites' aversion to working with blacks, integration creates inefficiencies that will cause joint product to be less than the sum of individual black and white worker marginal products. The firm will therefore follow an apartheid employment policy unless there are sufficiently large complementarities to be exploited, i.e. if the gains from complementarity exceed the losses attributable to co-worker discrimination.
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More recently, Kahn (1991) sets out a model of customer discrimination in which whites and blacks are represented as different inputs in the production function. He models blacks and whites as distinct inputs because if customers are prejudiced, they will act as if the amount of black input is equal to just a fraction of the input of otherwise identical white workers. Similarly, Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) present a model of a professional sports team where white and non-white athletes are imperfect substitutes due to racial differences in prior training and experience. 3 An extensive empirical literature on wage discrimination emerged during the 1970s, all based on the original Becker-Arrow model of perfect substitution. The accumulating evidence was called into question in the early 1980s, however, as a number of studies concluded that racial and ethnic groups were not perfectly substitutable. These studies typically applied econometric models of Translog or Generalized Leontief aggregate production functions to estimate elasticities of complementarity between groups. Grant and Hamermesh (1981) , for example, found that black adults are imperfect substitutes for white men and complements to white women and youths; Borjas (1983) provided evidence which suggested that whilst black males were imperfect substitutes for white males, Hispanic males and white males were complementary; Borjas (1987) showed that black natives are imperfect substitutes for white natives; and Kahanec (2006) found that non-whites are complementary to whites.
The traditional empirical approach for testing wage discrimination is generally unsuitable where cross-assignment discrimination is concerned because it is based on a presumption that whites and non-whites are perfect substitutes. While empirical researchers have usually controlled for job assignment differences with dummy variables, that approach has severe limitations because it fails to adequately control for the structure of the underlying production function. As Hashimoto and Kochin (1980) argue, failure to account for any and all sources of productivity differences will generally exaggerate the estimated effects of discrimination.
In a recent theoretical contribution, BS extend the traditional Becker-Arrow model to ascertain how predictions regarding cross-assignment discrimination vary with the form of the production function. Using an approach similar to Kahn (1991) , BS measure the extent of customer prejudice against non-white workers by a parameter, D. 4 Customer prejudice may 7 be interpreted as a situation in which customers discount the marginal revenue product (MRP) of non-white workers. The lower (higher) is D, the more (less) intense is the prejudice and the lower (higher) is non-white MRP. Prejudice dissipates as D approaches 1 and reaches a maximum as D falls to 0. While it is traditional to think of customer discrimination as implying a price discount on the output of non-white workers, the approach above is equivalent. The parameter D reflects the idea that non-white labour is valued less when customers are prejudiced. 5 In terms of the Generalized Leontief function (GLF), for example, the impact of D is seen as follows:
(1)
X is the quantity of white labour input i, labour market. In general, taste discrimination in pay and hiring is a market outcome that results from employers acting upon their own racial preferences and/or implementing the racial preferences of customers or co-workers. 5 BS' approach implies that consumers can discern the racial characteristics of workers when purchasing or consuming the particular good or service in question. Such an assumption is not unrealistic and examples abound of environments in which such an approach to discounting non-white MRP is likely to hold. At professional sports events, white (non-white) fans witness non-white (white) players' contribution to athletic entertainment. If sports fans of one skin colour are prejudiced against players of another colour, this may result in lower pay to the latter group. A similar situation may arise in other entertainment services, e.g. films, theatre, popular music. More generally, there are many production situations in which consumers must interact with minority workers in order for a good or service to be dispensed, e.g. white patients interacting with non-white nurses or doctors, non-white clients interacting with white legal advisers, and white airline passengers interacting with non-white flight attendants. There will also be cases where prejudiced white consumers may not necessarily see non-white workers during the act of purchase or consumption, but mere knowledge of the racial composition of the work force may influence buying decisions. For example, white consumers may place a lower valuation on, or even refuse to purchase, food products, or appliance repair services, or the processing of important financial transactions, knowing that those goods or services were manufactured or performed by non-white workers.
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The first term on the right-hand side of (2) is the wage ratio when there is prejudice (i.e.
when D <1) whereas the second term is the wage ratio in the absence of prejudice (i.e. when D = 1). The MDC is the difference between the two ratios and measures the ceteris paribus racial pay gap.
Applying equation (2) to the case of cross-assignment discrimination, the ceteris paribus racial pay gap between whites performing job 1 and non-whites performing job 2 is:
Similarly, the ceteris paribus racial pay gap between whites performing job 2 and non-whites performing job 1 is:
BO derive the above measure of cross-assignment discrimination for four different production functions -Generalized Leontief, Quadratic, CES, and Cobb-Douglas. The
Generalized Leontief provides the most general results, although closed form solutions are not possible. Closed form solutions, which are obtainable from the other three functions but only under restrictive assumptions, suggest that most predictions are generally robust across functional forms and that cross-assignment discrimination depends upon productivity and labour supply differences between the various worker groups, labour market structure, and the interaction between relative group productivity and prejudice. A uniform prediction across all four production functions is that changes in the relative productivity of one racial group induces changes in cross-assignment discrimination. For example, in all four cases, higher white (non-white) productivity raises (lowers) the amount of discrimination. 6 This is an important finding, both academically and in terms of policy. If non-whites are able to improve their skill-base, or if technological progress impacts more favorably on non-whites relative to whites, then cross-assignment discrimination may be reduced. An increase in white productivity, however, will lead to an unintended adverse consequence by increasing discrimination against non-whites. 
BS' findings have an important general implication:
Researchers must control for both productivity differences between white and non-white workers, as well as the interaction between race and productivity, when estimating the extent of cross-assignment discrimination.
6 Whilst BS frame their theoretical model in terms of racial discrimination, it is clearly applicable to other types of labour market discrimination, for example, where workers are discriminated against on account of their age, gender, nativity status, sexual orientation, religious affiliations, or other characteristics that may be targets of employer, employee, or consumer prejudice.
A Test Case: Major League Baseball
In order to test empirically the BS model of cross-assignment discrimination, we searched for an appropriate test case viz. an industry where: (i) there are accurate data on salaries and productivity for individual workers across distinct job assignments and these data are available for different firms; (ii) the productivities of job assignment groups within the firm are interrelated; (iii) there is racial integration; (iv) the pay of some workers is competitively determined, whilst the pay of others is determined under conditions resembling monopsony;
(v) there is potential for customer discrimination; and (vi) there have been changes in the number of employers in the industry over time.
One industry satisfying all these criteria is Major League Baseball (MLB) in the USA. Hits by Pitches and Total Bases. We also include the summary measure of On Base plus Slugging (OPS). We distinguish between hitters that are 'designated hitters' from those who are not. A designated hitter is a player who is chosen at the start of the game to bat in lieu of the pitcher in the line-up. We also distinguish, using dummies, between hitters that serve other types of positions. These include whether the hitter served as an infielder or a catcher.
We measure a pitcher's productivity by use of the following individual career statistics: Tables 2 and 3 
Empirical Analysis

Descriptive Statistics
Empirical Methodology
Wage discrimination occurs when individuals who are identical in terms of their productive characteristics are paid differently on account of their non-productive characteristics. Any empirical analysis of discrimination thus requires some control of productivity -it would not be surprising, and nor would it suggest discrimination, if more productive individuals were paid more than less productive individuals. In the traditional literature such control is usually straightforward since the individuals under scrutiny are performing the same job. In our model, however, it is problematic. Our concern is whether there is discrimination across job assignments, that is, where individuals with different non-productive characteristics are performing different jobs -do male airline pilots earn more than female flight attendants because of their occupation or because of their gender? This is a difficult issue to address empirically because we need to control for the productivity of both the pilot and the flight attendant or, more generally, we need to control for assignment-specific productivity. Clearly some measures of productivity will be common across job assignments -for example, education, job-tenure, and labour market experience. By definition, however, some measures of productivity will be unique to particular job assignments and it is controlling for these that is the real challenge.
One possible solution is to adopt a two-stage generated regressor approach. 9 Assume that wages reflect productivity as follows: To ascertain the level of discrimination across player positions, we need to control for position-specific productivity. In one sense this is straightforward because some measures of off-field productivity (MLB experience and tenure with current team, for example) are common across pitchers and hitters. On-field measures of productivity, however, vary across hitters and pitchers; e.g. runs for hitters and strike-outs for pitchers. Given our objective of ascertaining the extent of racial discrimination across job assignments, we need a standardized productivity measure. We thus adopt the following twostage approach. We first assume that wages reflect productivity as follows:
ln w ij denotes the log wage of a member of group i = 1,2,..., I employed in job assignment j = 1,2,..., J , 0 j  is a vector of 'assignment-specific' productivity measures, 1  is a vector of 'common' (i.e. cross assignment) productivity measures (e.g. education, tenure), and the B's denote parameter vectors. Our aim is to derive an estimating equation of the form: (6) where 0  denotes some standardised (imputed) measure of assignment-specific productivity.
To this end, we estimate the following 'first-stage' group-assignment regressions:
That is, we estimate separate wage regressions for individual within each job assignment, including as explanatory variables only the various assignment-specific productivity measures. Thus, we estimate separate wage regressions for hitters and pitchers on only their respective position-specific variables in both individual (I) and summary (S) form: We then use the predicted values from these regressions, ŵ =ŵ ij ;"i, j ( ) , as a standardized measure of assignment-specific productivity in second-stage regressions of the form:
Cross-Assignment Regression Analysis
Our estimates of equation (7) -the first stage regression -for hitters and pitchers respectively are set out in Tables 4 and 5 Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In the first specification of Table 4 , the individual hitter performance measures are used as regressors. A player's total number of bases has a significant positive effect on his salary.
Controlling for this, players who obtain a lot of their bases through singles (i.e. have a lot of hits or at bats) have lower salaries, however this effect is not significant. Being hit by a pitch is also a significant determinant of salary. In the second specification of the table, the individual measures are replaced with OPS, which is found to have a highly significant positive effect on salary.
In the first specification of Table 5 , pitchers' individual performance measures are included in the salary regression. Strike outs have a highly significant positive effect on salary. Shutouts, saves and conceding few home runs are also important. Having a lot of complete games is seen to lower relief pitchers' salaries, but have no effect on starters'
salaries. Holding everything else equal, starters are seen to earn more than relief pitchers.
When DICE is used in place of the individual performance measures in specification 2, it is found to have a significant negative effect on salary, as predicted, and this is found to be stronger for starters than for relief pitchers. Table 6 provides an analysis of how salary and productivity (as estimated in Tables 4 and Table 5 ) varies across position and race/ethnicity groups: Notes: *, ** and *** denote significant difference from whites in the same position at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. †, † † and † † † denote significant difference from whites in the opposite position at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
In the first panel of Table 6 we compare the mean (log) salary across race / position groups.
In all cases hitters earn more than pitchers but the gap is particularly large for blacks and Hispanics. Black pitchers earn significantly less than white pitchers, black and Hispanic pitchers earn significantly less than white hitters whilst black and Hispanic hitters earn significantly more than white pitchers. The key question is whether these cross-assignment gaps are due to systematic differences across races in pitching and hitting ability or whether they reflect discrimination with equally productive players being remunerated differently depending upon race. In the second panel of Table 6 we compare mean (log) salary less estimated productivity across race / position groups. It is apparent that most of the crossassignment differences are now insignificant, suggesting that the differences in salary may be 20 largely explained by differences in performance. However, black pitchers appear to be underpaid relative to their productivity compared to both white pitchers and white hitters.
The values in the second panel implicitly assume that whites, blacks and Hispanics are all rewarded at the same rate for given increases in productivity. The theory of BS, however, suggests that this may not be case. In addition, the values do not control for components of productivity that affect both pitchers and hitters. Therefore, we set out our estimate of equation (8) (i.e. the second stage regression) in Table 7 and Table 8 following.
In Table 7 we report four second-stage specifications with log salary being regressed on imputed productivity from Table 4 and Table 5 , dummy variables for race and position, interactions between productivity, race and position, and a set of controls for professional characteristic that affect the salaries of both pitchers and hitter. Whites are the reference category in all specifications. In specifications (1)- (3), imputed productivity is derived from individual productivity measures [i.e. specification (1) in Table 4 and Table 5 ] whilst specification (4) is derived from the relevant summary measure employed in specification (2) of Table 4 (i.e. OPS) and Table 5 (i.e. DICE).
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Despite the tendency to focus on 'hitters versus pitchers' baseball remains a team sport and we allow for possible complementarities in production by introducing team fixed effects in specifications (2)- (4) of Table 7 to control for both differences in teams' abilities to pay and team spill-overs. 11 We also control for the possibility that discrimination reflects a team's willingness to only select players of races that are common in the local area by including in specification (3) the percentages of each race category living in the greater metropolitan area in which the team is located.
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The results in Table 7 suggest strong evidence of both cross-and within-assignment discrimination in MLB. Our estimated coefficients are robust across the four specifications and suggest that, at the mean of productivity, white hitters earn 0.14% more than black pitchers; 2.13% less than Hispanic pitchers; 0.69% less than black hitters; 0.14% less than Hispanic hitters; and 1.55% less than white pitchers.
The coefficients on the triple interactions (i.e. position × race × productivity) capture how much a given increase in productivity is rewarded in the labour market within a specific position-race group relative to its effect on white hitters. It would appear that up to a certain level of productivity, our results support BS' predictions. Consider, for example, black pitchers versus white hitters: We know from Table 6 that black pitchers are underpaid relative to white hitters. In Table 7 , we see a positive and significant positive coefficient on black*pitcher and a negative and significant coefficient on black*pitcher*productivity. This suggests that at low productivity levels, black pitchers are overpaid compared to whites and that, in this region, an increase in black pitcher productivity will decrease the MDC. Beyond a certain performance level, however, the earnings of black pitchers fall below those of white hitters. In this region, blacks pitchers are relatively underpaid, and raising their productivity will increase the MDC. Comparing Hispanic pitchers to white hitters, we find the opposite relationship with Hispanic pitcher being relatively underpaid (overpaid) at low (high) levels of productivity. The two cases are illustrated graphically in Figure 1 with black and Hispanic pitcher pay equalling that of white hitters at productivity levels of 13.57 and 12.12 respectively:
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Figure 1: Cross Assignement Wage Discrimination and Productivity
Four additional regressions are set out in Table 8 . Specification (1) groups U.S.-born Hispanics with whites (using Hispanic classification based on players' facial appearances).
Specification (2) uses players' performance measures from the previous season, rather than career performance to date, in the first-stage regressions since it might be expected that these have a greater effect on salary than performance several seasons before. Finally, to explore how discrimination varies with the degree of monopsony power, specifications (3) and (4) split the sample into free agents and non-free agents respectively.
It would appear from Table 8 that our results are robust to treating U.S. born
Hispanics as whites and to estimating productivity on the previous season's performance rather than on career performance to date. Finally, we find evidence that discrimination is higher amongst non-free agents, a result that would appear to contradict BS' prior that discrimination may decline with the degree of monopsony power in the market. Notes: 1. All specifications include the regressors from specification (3) of Table 7 ; 2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 3. White Hitter is the reference category;
Decomposition Analysis
In this section, we attempt to identify cross-assignment discrimination using another empirical approach. The fact that players of a particular race in a particular position enjoy a wage differential over players of another race in another position could be a reflection of the former group's greater endowment of 'earning characteristics'. White pitchers may, for example, be more productive or have more experience on average than non-white (i.e. black or Hispanic)
hitters. Alternatively, white pitchers may be better rewarded for the characteristics they do possess, suggesting some form of positive (negative) discrimination from employers towards white pitchers (non-white hitters). To address this issue we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to separate the earnings differential into an 'endowment component', to account for differences in endowments between individuals, and a 'price component', which is usually associated with discrimination.
12
Recalling equation (7), we write the earnings function of players of race j in position i as:
where i = W , NW ( ) and j = H, P ( ) denote white and non-white and pitchers and hitters respectively, and where
( ) denotes black and Hispanic respectively.
denotes our vectors of position-specific and common productivity characteristics, the corresponding coefficient vectors to be estimated, and e ij some well-behaved error term.
Thus, the earnings functions of white pitchers, non-white pitchers, white hitters and non-white hitters may be denoted:
(12)
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition divides wage differentials into a part that is 'explained' by group differences in productivity and a residual part that cannot be accounted for by such differences in wage determinants. This latter 'unexplained' component is often used as a measure for discrimination. For example, the predicted average white pitcher/non-white hitter (WP-NWH) differential may be represented as:
The first term, , represents differences in endowments between members of the two groups whilst the second term, , represents differences in coefficients and thus, by extension, rewards. Note that if the overall differential is negative (i.e.
) but the second term is positive [i.e. ], then it would suggest that non-white hitters are discriminated against despite earning, on average, more than white hitters -i.e. non-white hitters would do even better with the earnings generating function of white pitchers than with their own. Table 9 reports the above decomposition analysis on the salary gaps between each crossassignment pair. Focussing on the mean decomposition results first, it is apparent from the first and second panels of Table 8 that our regression model implies a positive salary premium for black and Hispanic hitters over white pitchers ceteris paribus. The decomposition suggests that this premium would be even greater in the absence of discrimination, with discrimination against black and Hispanic hitters alleviating the potential differential by almost 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively.
The third and fourth panels focus on the white hitter / black pitcher and white hitter / Hispanic pitcher decomposition. Both decompositions imply a positive mean salary premium at for white hitters with discrimination playing a relative minor role in the white hitter / black pitcher differential, discrimination against white hitters reducing the potential white hitter premium by just under 5 per cent. It would appear that discrimination plays a much more significant role in the white hitter / Hispanic pitcher differential with discrimination against white hitters reducing the potential differential by just over 60 per cent.
The results set out in Table 9 suggest that the coefficients effect generally works to reduce the minority group's salary, even where that group has higher average pay. However, the quantile decomposition suggests that that at the bottom of the salary distribution over 100% of cross-assignment differences between race groups is explained by differences in observable productivity, with differences in rewards working to reduce the gap. At the top end of the salary distribution, the coefficients effect is mostly insignificant, a finding that is consistent with a situation in which salaries are compressed at the bottom end of the distribution [Papps (2013) ]. The mean results refer to Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the differences in log salary between the two groups and use the coefficients of the second group in each case; 2. The percentile results refer to decompositions of the differences between the quantile function of log salary for the two groups, as described in Chernozhukov et al. (2009) ; In all cases, the regressors include age, estimated productivity, experience, experience squared, tenure, free agent, salary arbitration eligibility, American League, Canadian team, average annual income, metropolitan area population, year dummies and a constant; 3. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Our decomposition results are also consistent with our regression results from the previous section. That is, for the white hitter / black pitcher decomposition, whilst the coefficients effect explains part of the overall wage gap (cf. the first column of Table 9 with the second panel of Table 6 ), at the 10 th (90 th ) percentile the coefficients effect reduces (widens) inequality, as illustrated in Figure 1 . As regards the white hitter / Hispanic pitcher decomposition, the coefficients effect implies that Hispanic hitters earn more than they should, given their productivity, at both the 10 th and 90 th percentiles, a finding that is also consistent with Figure 1 assuming that Hispanic hitters are always in the upper region.
Final Comments
In this study we address a widely neglected problem in the literature on taste discrimination in pay: ascertaining the extent to which racial or gender differences in pay across job assignments are attributable to prejudice. Virtually every wage discrimination study has focused on discrimination within the same job assignment, thus treating whites and non-whites (or males and females) as perfect substitutes. In a recent contribution, BS investigate the case of discrimination across job assignments, where assignments are viewed as distinct inputs. BS' theoretical findings underscore the importance of carefully considering the production function when there are productivity differences between majority and minority workers. An important finding from their theoretical analysis is that the magnitude of, for example, differences in white relative to non-white productivity influences the amount of discrimination. Furthermore, when whites and non-whites are interrelated in production, race and productivity will interact. This is an important implication, for it means that whenever white and non-white workers have productivity differences, the researcher should include productivity x race interactions in any empirical specification.
We test BS' model using data from Major League Baseball, an industry characterized by complementary job assignments, a history of racial integration and discrimination, and a dual labour market structure. We find convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player job assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and positionspecific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BS' theoretical prior that racial pay differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities.
7. Hits by pitches (HBP) records the number of times that a batter or his equipment (other than his bat) is hit in some part of his body by a pitch from the pitcher. A hit batsman is awarded first base, provided that (in the plate umpire's judgment) he made an honest effort to avoid the pitch. 8. Total bases are the number of bases a player has gained through hitting. It is the sum of his hits weighted by 1 for a single, 2 for a double (if he gets to second base as a result of his hit), 3 for a triple (if he gets to third base) and 4 for a home run. Only bases attained from hits count toward this total. After a player collects a hit, whether it be a single, double, triple or home run, the total bases stat can be applied. Whether or not this player advances further during the inning, by stealing a base or advancing off another players hit, does not increase his/her total base number. Thus, TB = 1B + 2 2B 
Pitchers
12.
A pitcher is assigned a win or a loss depending on whether he was the pitcher of record when the decisive run was scored. One is the pitcher of record if one is the pitcher at the point when the player who scores the decisive run is allowed to reach a base. 13. Complete games is the number of games where the pitcher was the only pitcher for his team. 14. A pitcher earns a save if he enters a game led by the pitcher's team, finishes the game without surrendering the lead, is not the winning pitcher, and either (a) the lead was three runs or fewer when the pitcher entered the game; (b) the potential tying run was on base, at bat, or on deck; or (c) the pitcher pitched three or more innings. 15. Number of home runs conceded (HR) which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, is the number of pitches that were hit by batters which were scored as a home run. 16. A pitcher is assigned a walk, which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, if he allows a batter to reach base after pitching him four balls. He is assigned a strikeout (K) if he pitches three strikes (pitched balls counted against the batter, typically swung at and missed or fouled off) in a row. 17. An inning is one of nine periods in a MLB game in which each team has a turn at bat; innings pitched is the number of such periods when the pitcher was working. 18. Earned run average is negatively correlated with the pitcher's ability to prevent the opposing team from scoring. It equals the number of times the pitcher allows a batter to score a Run (where the batter scores a point by advancing around the bases and reaching home plate safely) multiplied by nine, divided by the number of Innings Pitched. 19. Defense-Independent Component ERA (DICE) was created in 2001 as a variation on Component ERA (CERA).
CERA was created to create a more accurate way of evaluating pitchers than ERA. Whereas ERA is significantly affected by luck (such as whether the component hits are allowed consecutively), CERA eliminates this factor and assigns a weight to each of the recorded 'components' of a pitcher's performance. For CERA, these are singles, doubles, triples, home runs, walks and hit batters. DICE is an improvement on CERA that removes the contribution of the pitcher's defense and instead estimates a pitcher's ERA from the components of his pitching record that do not involve defense. These are home runs, walks, hits by pitch and strikeouts. DICE is thus calculated as: DICE = 3+ 13HR + 3 BB + HBP ( ) -2K é ë ù û IP
